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Judges are sometimes accused of disobeying statutes under the guise 
of interpreting the law. When this claim of judicial disobedience is 
fair, the interpretation of the law may be said to be unconstitutional. 
By “unconstitutional”, I do not mean contrary to the standards of a 
written Constitution, but unconstitutional in the sense of contrary to 
the most fundamental, unwritten constitutional rules of a legal 
system—what H.L.A. Hart called “rules of recognition”, which 
validate all other rules in the legal system.1 My focus in this article is 
on unconstitutional interpretation of statutes in the United Kingdom, 
where the rule of recognition accords legal supremacy to Acts of 
Parliament. But it is worth noting that all legal systems contain 
unwritten rules of recognition, and even in legal systems with a 
written Constitution, some interpretations of statutes (or, indeed, 
some interpretations of the written Constitution itself) can also be 
unconstitutional in this sense. 
One example of alleged unconstitutional interpretation is the 
lead judgment by Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury in R. (on the 
application of Evans) v Attorney General,2 critics of which have 
claimed was an “unconstitutional departure from the terms of the 
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1 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 3rd edn (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2012). 
2 R. (on the application of Evans) v Attorney General [2015] UKSC 21; [2015] 
A.C. 1787.  
Act”.3 Evans, which I will use as a case study throughout this article, 
concerned the interpretation of s.53 of the Freedom of Information 
Act 2000, which empowered a member of the executive to override a 
decision of the Information Commissioner or the Upper Tribunal on 
the disclosure of information. Purporting to exercise this power, the 
then Attorney General, Dominic Grieve Q.C., issued a certificate to 
override a decision by the Upper Tribunal, a judicial body with the 
status of the High Court, which had ordered the disclosure of Prince 
Charles’s correspondence with government ministers on matters of 
public policy, the so-called “black-spider memos”. Rob Evans, a 
Guardian journalist, sought judicial review of the Attorney General’s 
use of the veto power to prevent disclosure. 
The Supreme Court was divided in Evans. According to Lord 
Neuberger, with whom Lord Kerr and Lord Reed agreed, an 
executive power to override a judicial decision, merely because the 
executive disagrees with it, would be contrary to two “fundamental 
components of the rule of law”.4 For this reason, Lord Neuberger 
interpreted s.53 in a way that drastically limited its scope and denied 
the Attorney General the power to override the Upper Tribunal’s 
decision in Evans.5 According to the two dissentients, Lords Hughes 
and Wilson, the majority’s interpretation was “simply too highly 
strained a construction of the section”; indeed, it did not really 
interpret the provision at all, but “re-wrote it”, contrary to the 
overriding constitutional principle of parliamentary sovereignty.6 
However, any claim of unconstitutional interpretation faces 
significant challenges. Three main challenges to the claim of 
unconstitutional interpretation are examined in this article. First, 
Hart’s theory that the existence and content of a legal system’s rule 
of recognition is determined by a convergent practice among the 
legal system’s officials seems to be vulnerable to Ronald Dworkin’s 
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challenge that it ignores pervasive disagreement among officials 
about the criteria of legal validity (what Dworkin called “theoretical 
disagreement”).7 What some may claim is an unconstitutional 
interpretation is, according to Dworkin, actually reasonable 
disagreement over how to identify the law—reasonable because there 
is no convergent practice, and hence no rule of recognition, that 
could resolve the disagreement. 
The second challenge to the claim of unconstitutional 
interpretation is the argument that statutes do not have a fixed 
meaning that can be determined without evaluating all the relevant 
considerations, including the relevant moral considerations, in the 
context of its application. For example, T.R.S. Allan, defending his 
understanding of the common law constitution and its consequences 
for statutory interpretation, argues that in cases such as Evans “there 
is no such ‘disobedience’, merely legitimate interpretative 
disagreement.”8 At its most extreme, this challenge suggests that the 
breadth of the range of reasonable interpretations entails that there 
will almost never be judicial disobedience under the guise of 
interpretation. This second challenge, though related to the first, is 
distinct because reasonable disagreement over the best interpretation 
of a statute is consistent with the existence of a rule of recognition 
that requires the law to be identified with the meaning of the statute. 
If we can adequately respond to these two challenges, a third 
challenge enters the scene: if there are rules of recognition, and if 
judges sometimes identify as law norms that are inconsistent with the 
meaning of a statute, then, according to this third challenge, one of 
two things follow: either the rule of recognition does not require the 
law to be identified with the content of the statute, or the rule of 
recognition is indeterminate on this point. In either case, 
disobedience to the statute under the guise of interpretation would be 
consistent with the rule of recognition, and hence not 
unconstitutional. Disobedience to the statute would not entail 
disobedience to the law. 
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These three challenges all contain some important truths, but 
they also contain errors. Disentangling the errors from the truths is 
the aim of this article. Responding to these challenges matters 
because of what it tells us about how to identify correctly the 
standards of a legal system, standards that include the criteria of legal 
validity and the valid laws that are identified by those criteria. The 
identification of the law is distinct from the question of whether the 
law thus identified should be applied and enforced, which is 
ultimately a moral question—for judges as much as for everyone 
else—to which I can only allude in this article.9 The separation 
between questions of identification and questions of application or 
enforcement has the consequence, which I briefly consider at the 
end, that disobedience under the guise of interpretation may be 
morally legitimate despite its unconstitutionality. 
 
RULES OF RECOGNITION AND THEORETICAL DISAGREEMENTS 
 
The constitutional foundations of any legal system, according to 
H.L.A. Hart, consist “in an ultimate rule of recognition providing 
authoritative criteria for the identification of valid rules of the 
system”.10 The rule of recognition is a social rule: that is, it exists 
because it is practised. More precisely, there is a pattern of 
convergent behaviour and the participants in the practice have a 
normative attitude towards that behaviour, treating it as something 
that they are required to do, and criticising deviations from the 
practice. One crucial feature of the rule of recognition is that it is 
presupposed by officials in identifying the law. The content of the 
rule of recognition depends on what criteria the officials use—and 
tacitly presuppose without stating—in identifying the law. The rule 
of recognition is not what officials say it is. Rather, its existence “is 
manifested in the general practice of identifying the rules by such 
criteria.”11 Statements such as “It is the law that...” are statements 
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10 Hart, The Concept of Law (2012), at p.245; see also at p.100. 
11 Hart, The Concept of Law (2012), at p.101; see also at pp.292–93: “normally, 
when a lawyer operating within the system asserts that some particular rule is valid 
he does not explicitly state but tacitly presupposes the fact that the rule of 
from the internal point of view of someone who uses (and, in that 
sense, accepts or presupposes the existence of) the rule of 
recognition. On the other hand, statements about the existence the 
rule of recognition are not internal statements of legal validity, but 
external statements of fact, the truth of which depends on evidence of 
official practice.12 
But what if there is no convergent behaviour among officials 
that could determine the criteria of legal validity? In Law’s Empire, 
Dworkin built an entire theory on the claim that legal philosophers 
such as Hart had provided “no plausible theory of theoretical 
disagreement in law”, by which he meant disagreement about the 
criteria of legal validity.13 What he saw as the pervasiveness of 
theoretical disagreement could not be reconciled with Hart’s claim 
that there is widespread acceptance, at least among officials, of a rule 
of recognition. Dworkin was not concerned with disagreement about 
the application of agreed criteria of legal validity, such as 
“empirical” disagreements or “borderline cases”, where the 
disputants disagree about the application of the agreed criteria to 
cases that they acknowledge are non-standard examples.14 Rather, 
Dworkin’s concern was with “pivotal” cases, where the disputants 
disagree about the criteria of legal validity. The pervasiveness of 
disagreement is open to question. Undoubtedly, there is pervasive 
agreement about the criteria of legal validity.15 This is true even if 
the reason for the agreement is the result of an overlap or 
convergence between rival views about the criteria of legal validity. 
The truth is that disagreement manifests itself relatively infrequently. 
But that is not to deny that such disagreement does occur and is 
important. 
Disagreement about the criteria of legal validity may arise in 
various ways. It may be disagreement about what the sources of law 
are (e.g., do statutes and precedents exhaust the sources or is moral 
soundness a criterion of legal validity?). But more often it is 
disagreement about how to determine the meaning of the sources and 
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12 Hart, The Concept of Law (2012), at pp.107–8. 
13 Dworkin, Law’s Empire (1986), at p.11. 
14 Dworkin, Law’s Empire (1986), at p.5 and pp.41–42. 
15 See B. Leiter, “Explaining Theoretical Disagreement” (2009) 76 U. Chicago L. 
Rev. 1215. 
the effect that the sources have on the content of the law (e.g., is the 
meaning of the law determined by the plain meaning of the text, or 
the legislators’ intention, or moral considerations among others?). In 
both cases, there can also be disagreement about how to settle these 
disagreements.16 
One of Dworkin’s favourite examples for thinking about 
theoretical disagreement was the judgment of the New York Court of 
Appeals in Riggs v Palmer.17 In that case, the question was whether 
Elmer Palmer could inherit under the valid will of his grandfather, 
whom he had murdered before the will could be changed. The 
majority held that the grandson had no right to inherit. Judge Earl, 
writing for the majority, argued that the court had a power to depart 
from the letter of the statute in favour of the presumed or 
hypothetical intention of the legislators, justified by the moral 
principle that no one shall profit from their own wrongdoing—a 
universal principle that Judge Earl suggested was not only a ground 
of interpretation, but could even trump the statute regardless of the 
legislators’ intentions.18 Judge Gray, in his dissent, argued that the 
court had no power to depart from the letter of the statute: the 
statute’s clarity “left no room for the exercise of an equitable 
jurisdiction by courts over such matters.”19 Gray and Earl therefore 
disagreed about the ultimate criteria of legal validity: for the former, 
it was the plain meaning of the statute; for the latter, it was the 
hypothetical intention of the legislators or the morally required 
result.20 
Disagreements about the criteria of legal validity can be 
resolved, according to Hart, only by reference to facts about the 
actual practice of the courts and the way in which they identify what 
                                                     
16 On the different types of theoretical disagreement, see D. Smith, “Theoretical 
Disagreement and the Semantic Sting” (2010) 30 O.J.L.S. 635 at 641–42. 
17 Riggs v Palmer 22 NE 188 (1889). 
18 Riggs v Palmer 22 NE 188 (1889), at p.190 (Earl J). See also Leiter, “Explaining 
Theoretical Disagreement” (2009) 76 U. Chicago L. Rev. 1215 at 1233. 
19 Riggs v Palmer 22 NE 188 (1889), at p.191 (Gray J). 
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on the basis of their preferred outcome. See Leiter, “Explaining Theoretical 
Disagreement” (2009) 76 U. Chicago L. Rev. 1215 at 1229 and 1242–47. 
counts as law.21 In the face of such disagreement, one of two 
possibilities follow. The first possibility is that, despite the divergent 
behaviour of a small minority of officials, there is a general 
convergence among most officials, and this convergent behaviour 
provides a uniquely right answer as to the criteria of legal validity. It 
is no part of Hart’s argument that there must be unanimous 
agreement about the content of the rule of recognition; it requires 
only that there is “general acceptance” among officials,22 in the 
sense that most officials identify the law in the same way,23 and they 
criticise any deviation from this shared practice. 
The second possibility is that the rule of recognition is 
indeterminate to the extent of disagreement, with no correct answer 
either way. Dworkin rejected this possibility: “[w]e cannot say that 
the social rule is uncertain when all the relevant facts about social 
behaviour are known … because that would violate the thesis that 
social rules are constituted by behaviour”; if there is no convergent 
behaviour, “no social rule exists on the issue … at all”.24 But social 
rules can be uncertain, if they can extend beyond the convergent 
behaviour. As with any social rule, the rule of recognition involves 
the regularity of behaviour being used as a rule for guiding 
behaviour. But is the behaviour required by the rule limited to the 
behaviour that is already regularly practised? From an internal 
viewpoint, the rule is not limited to the convergent behaviour: it 
extends further if the regularity of behaviour that gives rise to a norm 
in one case is taken to give rise to a norm in a new case that is 
different but similar—and there may be disagreement and 
uncertainty about whether it does, disagreement and uncertainty 
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understanding of Hart’s theory: see e.g., K. Toh, “Jurisprudential Theories and 
First-Order Legal Judgments” (2013) 8 Philosophy Compass 475. For a persuasive 
rejection of Toh’s interpretation, see B. Leiter, “Theoretical Disagreements in Law: 
Another Look” in D. Plunkett, S. Shapiro, and K. Toh (eds), Ethical Norms, Legal 
Norms: New Essays in Metaethics and Jurisprudence (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2017). 
22 Hart, The Concept of Law (2012), at p.108 (emphasis added). 
23 Hart, The Concept of Law (2012), at p.56: “the statement that a group has a 
certain rule is compatible with the existence of a minority who not only break the 
rule but refuse to look upon it as a standard either for themselves or others.” 
24 R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1977), at pp.54–55 and p.62. 
which may require recourse to moral reasoning.25 But from the 
external viewpoint, the rule of recognition does not extend to the new 
case, and hence those who take the rule as extending, or not 
extending, are mistaken.26 Whatever answer is given would become 
required by the rule of recognition only if official behaviour 
converges in a way that presupposes that answer to be correct. As 
Hart put it, “[h]ere all that succeeds is success.”27 
But why should we accept these two Hartian explanations of 
the implications of theoretical disagreement? After all, as intimated 
earlier, there is also disagreement about how to settle disagreements 
about the criteria of legal validity. Why should we accept Hart’s 
claim that disputes about the criteria of legal validity are settled by 
appeal to facts about the actual practice of officials? Dworkin 
disagreed with that claim, and that disagreement cannot be settled by 
the actual practice of officials. It can only be settled by considering 
the persuasiveness of Hart’s argument that the rule of recognition is 
the best way to understand the nature of law, a full defence of which 
is of course beyond the scope of one article. 
In developing an alternative to Hart’s theory, Dworkin argued 
that theoretical disagreement in the law should be settled by 
“constructive interpretation”. That is not to say that Dworkin thought 
that the actual practice of officials was irrelevant. Far from it. He 
thought that interpretation requires “a very great degree of 
consensus” in identifying the object of interpretation, and so there 
must be “enough initial agreement about what practices are legal 
practices”.28 He thought that an interpretation, in order to be an 
eligible interpretation, must meet a “rough threshold requirement” of 
fit with the paradigm instances of law that are found in the 
“preinterpretive” material, namely, the “brute facts of legal 
history”.29 Only when that threshold leaves two or more eligible 
interpretations does a judge face a hard case, requiring a moral 
judgment as to which interpretation presents the community’s legal 
                                                     
25 See T. Endicott, “Are There Any Rules?” (2001) 5 Journal of Ethics 199 at 217–
18. Cf. A. Tucker, “Uncertainty in the Rule of Recognition and in the Doctrine of 
Parliamentary Sovereignty” (2011) 31 O.J.L.S, 61 at 78–88. 
26 See also J. Gardner, “Some Types of Law” in D.E. Edlin (ed.), Common Law 
Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), at p.64. 
27 Hart, The Concept of Law (2012), at p.153.  
28 Dworkin, Law’s Empire (1986), at pp.65–66. 
29 Dworkin, Law’s Empire (1986), at p.255. 
history in its best light.30 Thus, Dworkin’s notion of preinterpretive 
agreement among officials is a fundamental constraint on 
constructive interpretation—so much so that Hart thought, with some 
justification, that it was ‘substantially the same’ as his account of the 
rule of recognition.31 
But Dworkin did not think that the initial agreement about the 
object of interpretation is determinative. He thought that what counts 
as law is ultimately determined by the moral principles that figure in 
the interpretation that provides the best justification of the 
preinterpretive materials. Although the rough threshold requirement 
of fit requires an eligible interpretation to be anchored in some 
proportion of preinterpretive paradigm cases, “no paradigm is secure 
from challenge by a new interpretation that accounts for other 
paradigms and leaves that one isolated as a mistake.”32 On this view, 
everyone may be wrong about what the law is, because they may be 
wrong about what morality requires. Dworkin’s is therefore a 
“protestant” theory of law: it entails that everyone should act on their 
own reasonable interpretation of the law.33 
Yet, contrary to Dworkin’s theory, it seems that there are 
paradigm instances of law that are indisputable, in the sense that no 
one could seriously deny that they are law.34 An interpretation that 
disputed an indisputable paradigm of law would not count as an 
interpretation of the law. If we accept Dworkin’s own claim that we 
should adopt the lawyer’s perspective in explaining the nature of 
law, his theory fails, for it is not how lawyers, including judges, 
understand the law.35 For example, if there is pervasive agreement 
that determining the content of the law is a matter of determining the 
meaning of a statute, then any purported interpretation of the law that 
                                                     
30 Dworkin, Law’s Empire (1986), at pp.255–56. 
31 Hart, The Concept of Law (2012), at p.267. 
32 Dworkin, Law’s Empire (1986), at p.72. 
33 Dworkin, Law’s Empire (1986), at p.190; R. Dworkin, “Civil Disobedience” in 
his Taking Rights Seriously (1977), at p.214. Cf. G.J. Postema, ‘“Protestant’ 
Interpretation and Social Practices” (1987) 6 Law and Philosophy 283. 
34 T. Endicott, “Herbert Hart and the Semantic Sting” (1998) 4 Legal Theory 283 at 
294–300. 
35 That is not to say that we should treat the lawyer’s perspective as the starting 
point in philosophy of law. See further J. Raz, “The Problem about the Nature of 
Law” in his Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in the Morality of Law and 
Politics, rev. edn (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994). 
departs from the meaning of the statute would not count as an 
eligible interpretation of the law. 
A legal system need not contain a rule of recognition that 
identifies the content of the law with the meaning of a legal source, 
such as a statute.36 But where it does, any interpretative 
disagreement—which causes the rule of recognition to be 
indeterminate on the correct method of interpretation of the statute—
need not affect the determinacy of the rule of recognition’s 
requirement that the content of the law is to be identified with the 
meaning of the statute. The point is that, where the settled practice 
involves officials identifying the content of the law with the meaning 
of a statute, no interpretation that is inconsistent with the meaning of 
the statute could count as an interpretation of the law—even if there 
is disagreement about how to interpret the source. 
That last claim may seem paradoxical: if there is 
disagreement about how to interpret a statute, the rule of recognition 
is indeterminate to that extent; but if the rule of recognition is 
indeterminate to that extent, how can an interpretation of the statute 
fail to satisfy the rule of recognition and so fail to count as an 
interpretation of the law? Part of the answer is that the conventional 
rules of recognition, which vary from legal system to legal system, 
do not exhaust the criteria for determining the meaning of a legal 
source. There are also universal features that an interpretation of a 
statute cannot fail to have if it is to count as an interpretation of that 
statute.37 The rule of recognition may tell us that the content of the 
law is identified with the meaning of a statute, but other universal 
features—including linguistic, systematic, teleological, and moral 
considerations—help to determine the meaning of the statute, and to 
distinguish interpretation from disobedience. 
 
INTERPRETATION AND DISOBEDIENCE 
                                                     
36 The acknowledgment of this point among at least “inclusive legal positivists” is 
largely overlooked or downplayed in Mark Greenberg’s objections to the view that 
the content of the law is the meaning of a legal text, which he describes as the 
“standard picture” accepted by most legal theorists, and which he believes faces 
serious theoretical problems: see M. Greenberg, “The Standard Picture and Its 
Discontents” in L. Green and B. Leiter (eds), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Law: 
Volume I (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); see also M. Greenberg, “How 
Facts Make Law” (2004) 10 Legal Theory 157. 
37 J. Raz, “Intention in Interpretation” in R.P. George, The Autonomy of Law: 
Essays on Legal Positivism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), at p.249 and 
p.280. 
 Interpretation requires an evaluative judgment about which meaning 
should be ascribed to an object. This need for evaluative judgment 
forms the basis of what I referred to at the outset as the second 
challenge to claims of unconstitutional interpretation. According to 
this challenge, the range of reasonable interpretations is broader than 
is often believed, so that what may look like disobedience is often 
better seen as a reasonable interpretation of the rule. As Allan puts it, 
“there is no such ‘disobedience’, merely legitimate interpretative 
disagreement.”38 
To consider this challenge more closely, let us return to the 
case of Evans. Section 53 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 
gave the “accountable person” (a government minister or the 
Attorney General) the power to override a notice requiring disclosure 
of information, if “he has on reasonable grounds formed the opinion” 
that there was no failure to comply with the duty arising under s.1(1) 
to disclose the information. There would be no failure to comply 
with that duty if the information is exempt and, in the case of 
“qualified” exemptions, “in all the circumstances of the case, the 
public interest in maintaining the exemption outweighs the public 
interest in disclosing the information.”39 The question was: did 
section 53 also give the executive a power to override a judicial 
decision (that is, the decision of the Upper Tribunal on appeal from 
the Commissioner’s decision) merely because the executive took a 
different view about the balance of public interests? The Supreme 
Court was divided on the extent to which statutory interpretation 
could be used to achieve the morally desired outcome. 
Allan’s challenge to critics of Lord Neuberger’s 
interpretation seems to gain added force in view of the implausibility 
of Lord Hughes’s contention that “the plain words of the statute” 
settled the matter.40 There was room for doubt over the meaning of 
s.53, which did not specifically state that the executive had the power 
to override a judicial decision on the same basis as it could override 
the Information Commissioner’s decision. That is not to deny that 
                                                     
38 Allan, “Statutory Interpretation: Why Complaints of Judicial Disobedience Make 
No Sense” (2016) University of Cambridge Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 
46/2016, at 4. 
39 Freedom of Information Act 2000, s.2(2)(b). 
40 Evans [2015] A.C. 1787 at [155] (Lord Hughes). See also Lord Wilson, at [168], 
arguing that Lord Neuberger had not interpreted but “re-wrote” s.53. 
statutes can have a plain meaning; statutes can have a plain meaning 
because, and to the extent that, there is no doubt or disagreement 
about how to apply them.41 But in Evans, the application of s.53 was 
open to doubt; there were decent arguments for competing 
interpretations, in part because a decent argument could be made that 
the executive’s purported power could have unreasonable 
consequences for (one interpretation of) the rule of law, as Lord 
Neuberger argued.42 All this ought to be conceded. But although 
Lord Hughes may therefore have mistakenly thought he had 
identified a plain meaning in s.53, nonetheless there were, as we 
shall see, good reasons supporting his interpretation. 
Even if s.53 did not have a plain meaning, it may have a 
determinate meaning. Interpretation involves the evaluation of 
competing reasons for different conclusions about which meaning 
ought to be ascribed to the object of interpretation. When the weight 
of the reasons favours one meaning over the other, that is the 
meaning the object has—the meaning is determinate. If, on the other 
hand, the reasons for the different meanings are finely balanced or 
incommensurable, then the meaning is indeterminate: different 
meanings are permissible, but none is required. Indeterminacy does 
not give rise to the need for interpretation; on the contrary, 
interpretation tells us whether the meaning is determinate or 
indeterminate.43 But whatever conclusion is reached, it is reached 
through an evaluative judgment, including moral evaluation. 
In his challenge, Allan argues not only that moral judgment is 
a necessary part of statutory interpretation, but that statutes can 
always, or almost always, be interpreted in a way that achieves a 
morally justified judicial decision.44 That is, if Lord Neuberger’s 
limits to the scope of the veto power were morally justified, all 
things considered, it would be the correct interpretation of the statute. 
                                                     
41 See Dworkin’s distinction between clear and unclear meanings in Dworkin, 
Law’s Empire (1986), at p.352, arguing that a statute is unclear only when “there 
are decent arguments for each of two competing interpretations of it.” 
42 Evans [2015] A.C. 1787 at [51]–[52] and [58] (Lord Neuberger). 
43 T. Endicott, “Legal Interpretation” in A. Marmor (ed.), The Routledge 
Companion to Philosophy of Law (London: Routledge, 2012), at p.112; T. 
Endicott, “Interpretation and Indeterminacy: Comments on Andrei Marmor’s 
Philosophy of Law” (2014) 10 Jerusalem Rev. Leg. Stud. 46. Cf. A. Marmor, 
Philosophy of Law (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011) 145. 
44 T.R.S. Allan, The Sovereignty of Law: Freedom, Constitution and Common Law 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), Chs 4–5. 
To respond to this challenge, we must show that it exaggerates the 
extent to which statutes can be interpreted to achieve a morally 
justified outcome. But in doing so we should not deny the role of 
moral judgment in statutory interpretation. Rather, moral reasons 
have a limited role in interpretation, for, as I will now explain, facts 
about the statutory text and the conventions of interpretation 
prevailing at the time of its enactment must constrain and override 
moral reasons. 
The reason for restricting the scope of moral judgment in 
legal interpretation arises from the authoritative nature of law. Law 
cannot fully fulfil its function to authoritatively guide its subjects to 
the extent that moral evaluation is necessary for determining the 
content of the law. The authoritative nature of law supports what 
Joseph Raz calls “the sources thesis”, which is the thesis that: “All 
law is source-based. … A law is source-based if its existence and 
content can be identified by reference to social facts alone, without 
resort to any evaluative argument.”45 Sources include all the social 
facts about customary meanings and understandings.46 On Raz’s 
view, the reason why law must be source-based is that, to be an 
authority, an institution must be capable of settling matters for its 
subjects and guiding their conduct. No one could be guided by an 
institution’s decision on a moral question if, to work out what that 
decision was, they had to engage in moral reasoning and answer the 
moral question that the authority was meant to settle. Thus, the 
identification of an authority’s decision must be made on factual 
considerations about what the institution said, not on moral 
considerations about what it should have said.47 As Raz puts it, 
 
The only point which is essential to the sources thesis 
is that the character of the rules of interpretation 
prevailing in any legal system, i.e. the character of the 
rules for imputing intentions and directives to the 
legal authorities, is a matter of fact and not a moral 
issue. It is a matter of fact because it has to sustain 
                                                     
45 J. Raz, “Authority, Law and Morality” in his Ethics in the Public Domain: 
Essays in the Morality of Law and Politics (1994), at pp.210–11. 
46 J. Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality, 2nd edn (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1979), at pp.47–48 and p.63. 
47 Raz, “Authority, Law and Morality” in his Ethics in the Public Domain (1994), 
at p.231. 
conclusions of the kind: “That is in fact the view held 
by these institutions on the moral issues in 
question.”48 
 
If a rule is created by an institution with authority to create 
the rule, respect for that authority requires the rule to be interpreted 
in the way it would have been interpreted at the time it was created. 
This claim is liable to mislead. It is commonly thought that statutory 
interpretation involves retrieving the intention of the legislature, and 
respect for authority seems to support this thought. After all, the very 
idea of legislative institutions is that of authorities that can 
deliberately decide how things will be done, making the law they 
intend to make.49 But by itself legislative intention cannot provide a 
guide to interpretation. All we can say is that legislators intend to 
legislate, and they intend the enacted statute to be given whatever 
meaning it has according to the conventions of interpretation 
prevailing at the time of enactment.50 Any further alleged intentions 
of the legislators, such as those derived from recordings of legislative 
proceedings such as Hansard, are irrelevant, unless made relevant by 
those conventions of interpretation. If the legislators have authority, 
we respect that authority (and the legislators’ relevant intentions) by 
interpreting the statute using the conventions prevailing at the time.51 
Raz calls such interpretation, involving the conventions 
prevailing at the time, a form of “conserving” interpretation,52 which 
                                                     
48 Raz, “Authority, Law and Morality” in his Ethics in the Public Domain (1994), 
at p.233. 
49 J. Raz, “Why Interpret?” (1996) 9 Ratio Juris 349 at 359–60; J. Raz, “Intention 
in Interpretation” in R.P. George (ed.), The Autonomy of Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1996), at p.259. 
50 Those who doubt whether institutions such as a legislature can have intentions 
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Empire (1986), at p.336; J. Waldron, “Legislators in Legal Philosophy” in his Law 
and Disagreement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), at p.43. 
51 Raz, “Intention in Interpretation” in George (ed.), The Autonomy of Law (1996), 
at p.280: “Intention legitimates, but conventions interpret.” For a similar 
conclusion, see R. Ekins, The Nature of Legislative Intent (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012), Ch.9. 
52 Note that conserving interpretations are not necessarily about respecting the 
author’s intention and retrieving an interpretation from the time of enactment. For 
a defence of this point, see J. Waldron, “Legislative Intent and Unintentional 
Legislation” in his Law and Disagreement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1999). For criticisms, see A. Marmor, “Authority and Authorship” in his Positive 
he distinguishes from “innovative” interpretations. In a sense, all 
interpretations purport to be both conserving (they aim to be faithful 
to the object being interpreted) and innovative (they aim to resolve 
doubts as to the meaning of the object).53 Raz’s claim is that 
interpretations can vary in the degree to which they are conserving 
and innovative: sometimes a more conserving interpretation is called 
for; at other times, a more innovative interpretation is called for. 
Conserving interpretation is not about conserving the object of 
interpretation, but about conserving a previous interpretation; and 
innovative interpretation is not about departing from the object, but 
is novel and may depart from a previous interpretation. 
But if the authoritative nature of law calls for conserving 
interpretation—using conventions of interpretation prevailing at the 
time of enactment—what role can there be for innovative 
interpretation in law? It seems that only a conserving interpretation 
can determine a legal rule’s meaning because only a conserving 
interpretation will respect its authority, and respect for its authority is 
necessary to avoid disobedience. How can we interpret a legal rule in 
a way that is novel and yet remain faithful to the rule’s authoritative 
nature? 
The answer is that the authoritative nature of law provides a 
constraint on innovative interpretation, but does not rule it out 
completely. Innovative interpretation is required when the 
conventions of interpretation leave the meaning of the statute 
indeterminate. In such instances, judges interpret the statute in a way 
that gives it a new meaning, and in that sense they make the statute 
more determinate.54 There was a time when, if a judge proclaimed 
his role in statutory interpretation to involve “filling in the gaps” by 
“supplement[ing] the written word”,55 he would be criticised for his 
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“Why Interpret?” (1996) 9 Ratio Juris 349 at 359. 
53 Cf. J. Goldsworthy, “Implications in Language, Law and the Constitution” in G. 
Lindell (ed.), Future Directions in Australian Constitutional Law: Essays in 
Honour of Professor Leslie Zines (Sydney: Federation Press, 1994) 162, 
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54 See J. Raz, “Interpretation without Retrieval” in A. Marmor (ed.), Interpretation 
in Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995). See also Raz, “Authority, Law 
and Morality” in his Ethics in the Public Domain (1994), at p.233. 
55 Magor and St Mellons Rural District Council v Newport Corporation [1950] 2 
All E.R. 1226 at 1236 (Denning L.J.); Seaford Court Estates Ltd v Asher [1949] 2 
K.B. 481 at 499; [1949] 2 All E.R. 155 (Denning L.J.). 
“naked usurpation of the legislative function under the thin disguise 
of interpretation.”56 But when the source-based considerations for 
interpreting a statute leave the statute’s meaning unspecified, there is 
nothing wrong with the courts turning to merits-based moral 
considerations to fill in the gap and make the statute’s meaning more 
determinate. By rendering more determinate a previously 
indeterminate rule, innovative interpretations change the object of 
interpretation: the rule is changed to include a meaning that is 
attributable not to the original creator, but to the author of the later 
interpretation.57 In this way, judges interpreting the law innovatively, 
do not apply the law, but develop it.58 There is nothing wrong with 
that when it is consistent with the statute’s indeterminate meaning. 
The problem arises—and the judge may fairly be accused of 
usurping the legislative function—when a purported interpretation is 
inconsistent with what the conventions of interpretation determine is 
the correct meaning of a statute. 
To return to the example of Evans, Lord Neuberger’s 
interpretation of s.53 was innovative—it did not retrieve an existing 
meaning, but developed and so changed it—and can be justified, 
therefore, only if the conventions of interpretation prevailing at the 
time of the statute’s enactment leave the meaning indeterminate, and 
the innovative interpretation is consistent with those source-based 
considerations. But it may seem as if Lord Neuberger did develop the 
law inconsistently with the meaning of the statute by reading in an 
exception to s.53 and thereby significantly narrowing the scope of its 
application. In cases such as these, involving reading in an 
exception—or what used to be called “equitable interpretation”—it 
seems as if statutory interpretation involves neither applying the 
statute, nor developing its meaning faithfully, but departing from its 
meaning and therefore disobeying the statutory rule. 
                                                     
56 Magor and St Mellons Rural District Council v Newport Corporation [1952] 
A.C. 189 at 191; [1951] 2 All E.R. 839 (Lord Simonds). 
57 This claim may seem counterintuitive. For the view that interpretation leaves the 
statute’s meaning unchanged, see In re Spectrum Plus Ltd [2005] UKHL 41; 
[2005] 2 A.C. 680 at [38] (Lord Nicholls): “when your Lordships’ House rules that 
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58 Raz, “Authority, Law and Morality” in his Ethics in the Public Domain (1994), 
at p.230. See also J. Gardner, “Legal Positivism: 5½ Myths” (2001) 46 Am J. Juris. 
199 at 221–22. 
To see whether this description is apposite, it is useful to 
compare the Evans case with an instance of equitable interpretation 
that seems to me to involve no disobedience to the statute, namely, 
the Court of Appeal’s judgment in the case of R. v Registrar 
General, ex parte Smith.59 Section 51(1) of the Adoption Act 1976 
provided that the Registrar General was under a duty to supply an 
adopted person with information to obtain his birth certificate. The 
Registrar General refused to give the applicant this information “on 
public policy grounds”, in light of the medical reports available, 
which highlighted the risk that the applicant would use the 
information to kill his natural mother.60 The text of s.51 of the 1976 
Act suggested that, if certain conditions were fulfilled, the Register 
General had an absolute duty to supply the information. It did not 
contain any exception on public policy grounds.61 But with echoes of 
Riggs v Palmer, the Court of Appeal in Smith interpreted the 1976 
Act as if it included an exception. Statutory interpretation contains 
all sorts of presumptions to avoid statutes being over-inclusive by 
being read literally, such as the “golden rule”, according to which 
statutes should be given their ordinary meaning unless it would lead 
to absurdity or repugnance.62  The Court of Appeal’s decision does 
not necessarily involve a departure from, and hence disobedience to, 
the duty in the statute. 
In Smith, the appearance of disobedience to the statutory duty 
is just that: an appearance. The reality, in my view, is that, although 
the interpretation develops, or adds to, the statute’s meaning—for it 
cannot be said to be implicit in the statute itself—it does so in a way 
that is consistent with the meaning of the statute. The absence of 
exceptions in the Adoption Act 1976 did not entail that there was an 
absolute duty to provide the information “come what may”.63 If it 
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had, the court’s interpretation would have been a disobedient one. 
But instead the plain meaning of the statute (to simplify, that an 
adopted person has a right to obtain his birth certificate) was 
unspecific in the sense that it did not state whether there was or was 
not an exception in these circumstances. That plain meaning is 
therefore consistent with the meaning that the Court of Appeal 
attributed to the statute (in effect, that an adopted person has a right 
to obtain his birth certificate, unless there are public policy grounds 
for refusing to give the information). 
The appearance of disobedience in cases such as Smith is 
readily understandable, because the justification for recognising the 
exception comes not from something about the object (the statute is 
silent on whether there should or should not be an exception), but 
from the reasons for departing from the statute.64 But equally it 
would be wrong to conclude that, when a statute imposes a duty 
without qualification, the statutory duty is absolute in the sense that it 
excludes all considerations that are not legally recognised as non-
excluded.65 This conclusion was suggested by Raz. He wrote:  
 
It is not that the law claims that one ought to obey the 
law come what may. There are many legal doctrines 
specifically designed to allow exceptions to legal 
requirements, doctrines such as self-defence, 
necessity, public policy, and the like. The point is that 
the law demands the right to define the permissible 
exceptions.66 
 
This passage does not suggest that a court is precluded from reading 
an exception into an unqualified statutory rule, for the court’s 
judgment would be an instance of the law defining the permissible 
exceptions. But Raz did suggest that the law’s claim (by which he 
meant the claim made by the law’s officials) to have the right to 
define the permissible exceptions entails that a legal rule excludes 
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Philosophy of Law (2012), at pp.119–20. 
65 T. Endicott, “Interpretation, Jurisdiction, and the Authority of Law” (2007) 6 
American Philosophical Association Newsletter 14 at 16 and 18. 
66 J. Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), at p.77 
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acting on all other reasons that are not legally recognised.67 Prior to 
the Smith decision, the common law had recognised an exception to a 
statutory rule on public policy grounds if application of the rule 
would enable someone to benefit from their own serious crime in the 
past. But no rule of law had previously recognised an exception 
where there was a risk of a future serious crime being committed. 
Thus, on Raz’s reasoning, the risk that a future serious crime would 
be committed was not a consideration that was legally recognised to 
be non-excluded—that is, it was not a legally permissible 
exception—and so the Court of Appeal’s decision in Smith was an 
instance of judicial disobedience to the statute, though this 
disobedience may have been morally legitimate. 
The better conclusion to draw, in my view, is that, when the 
law imposes a duty without qualification, it leaves the permissible 
exceptions undefined or unspecified. It is for the interpreter to work 
out whether a reason is non-excluded and can therefore justify an 
exception to the rule. This is a question about the limits of the law’s 
legitimate authority: its jurisdiction. As Timothy Endicott puts it, 
“[a] limit on jurisdiction is a ground of interpretation of an unspecific 
directive.”68 The law has legitimate authority to settle some matters, 
and the scope of those matters partly determines which reasons are 
legitimately excluded. The point is that there cannot be an exception 
to the rule simply because we disagree with the rule’s application. 
The exception must be for a reason that we judge to be non-
excluded. One way in which non-excluded reasons arise is in 
unforeseen or unforeseeable cases, though it can often be difficult to 
establish what was unforeseen or unforeseeable.69 Given that it is not 
reasonable to expect the legislature to foresee all possible 
circumstances, the lack of an explicit exception in the enacted rule 
does not necessarily—although, as we shall see, it may—present a 
barrier to attributing to the rule a meaning that incorporates the 
exception. 
                                                     
67 Raz, The Authority of Law (1979), at p.33: “what is excluded by a rule of law is 
not all other reasons, but merely those other reasons which are themselves not 
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68 Endicott, “Interpretation, Jurisdiction, and the Authority of Law” (2007) 6 
American Philosophical Association Newsletter 14 at 16. 
69 Cf. Ekins, The Nature of Legislative Intent (2012), at pp.275–76, arguing that 
only “in exceptional, unforeseen cases” is it possible to give a rule an equitable 
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An important feature of this analysis is that the considerations 
involved in determining whether to interpret the statute in a way that 
incorporates an exception are the same considerations involved in 
determining whether the legislature has acted outside the scope of its 
legitimate authority (its jurisdiction) and so whether it should be 
disobeyed. What distinguishes an interpretation of the statute from 
disobedience is, in part, the specificity of the statute. When the 
statute is unspecific, the aim of the interpreter is not to uncover what 
the authority would have intended in these circumstances; rather, to 
the extent that the legislature would have acted outside its legitimate 
authority if it specifically prohibited an exception, the interpreter is 
free to deviate from the intended meaning and offer an innovative 
interpretation.70 If the rule had specifically excluded an exception in 
this context, however, the correct interpretation would have been 
different: there would have been an overwhelming reason against 
attributing to the rule a meaning that includes the exception. But by 
specifically denying what ought to have been an exception, the 
authority may be said to have lost its legitimacy, and we may be 
morally justified in disobeying the rule.71 
But that does not entail that unspecific rules can always be 
given an equitable interpretation. And it is here that we see the 
difference between Smith and Evans. The difference is that in Smith 
there was nothing in the statute to suggest that the legislature had 
foreseen the circumstances that arose, whereas the same cannot be 
said for Evans. In the latter case, as Lord Neuberger acknowledged, 
s.53(4)(b) extended the executive’s veto power to after the tribunal’s 
decision, demonstrating that Parliament, in the text of the statute, had 
foreseen the circumstances in which a member of the executive 
would override a judicial decision. Applying the principle of legality, 
which means that Parliament cannot override fundamental rights or 
the rule of law by general or ambiguous words,72 Lord Neuberger 
                                                     
70 Raz, “Intention in Interpretation” in George (ed.), The Autonomy of Law (1996), 
at p.294. Cf. Ekins, The Nature of Legislative Intent (2012), at p.276.  
71 Cf. Allan, The Sovereignty of Law (2013), at pp.195–96. While Allan concedes 
that the statute’s literal meaning “limits our scope for interpretative ingenuity” and 
that “the context may show that alternative and otherwise preferable meanings are 
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reasonable, “is incapable of enacting measures wholly contrary to justice or the 
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72 See e.g., R. v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Pierson 
[1998] A.C. 539 at 575; [1997] 3 All E.R. 577 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson); R. v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Simms [2000] 2 AC 115 at 
argued that s.53(4)(b) was “a very long way indeed” from making it 
“crystal clear” that the section enables a member of the executive to 
overrule a judicial decision “simply because he does not agree with 
it.”73 Lord Neuberger thought that a decision of the tribunal, which 
was better placed to make the right decision, could be vetoed by the 
executive only if there was a material change of circumstances since 
the decision or if its decision was demonstrably flawed in fact or in 
law.74 That interpretation gives the veto power an extremely narrow 
scope. 
The flaw in this reasoning is to accept the claim that statutes 
can only override fundamental rights or the rule of law when 
Parliament clearly specifies that that is what the statute is doing. The 
text of s.53 may have been unspecific on the issue in dispute. But 
since s.53(4)(b) expressly provides for an executive override of a 
judicial decision, Parliament clearly foresaw—that is, expressly 
provided for—this scenario. If it had wanted to qualify this power in 
the way that Lord Neuberger suggested—that is, by limiting the 
power to very narrow circumstances—it could have done so. The 
fact that it foresaw an executive veto of a judicial decision, and did 
not enact Lord Neuberger’s qualifications, is an overwhelming 
reason for rejecting his interpretation. There are other reasons for 
doing so,75 but that is the most significant. By ignoring these limits to 
the interpretation of unspecific directives, Lord Neuberger’s 
judgment did not interpret s.53; he “re-wrote it”, as Lord Wilson said 
in his dissent.76  
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Lord Neuberger’s reasons for his interpretation are reasons 
for not enacting the provision at all.77 There were also good reasons 
why Parliament did enact it, namely to give the final word on 
whether disclosure is in the public interest to a politician accountable 
to Parliament.78 There was nothing absurd or repugnant about this 
interpretation (as there was in the plain meaning of the statute in 
Smith); and even if it were thought to be repugnant, the context of the 
statute (particularly s.53(4)(b), as mentioned in the preceding 
paragraph) was sufficient to rebut the presumption in the so-called 
golden rule. In any case, in interpreting statutes, the point is not to 
work out whether there are good reasons for or against enacting the 
statute, but to work out whether there are good reasons for ascribing 
this meaning to the statute.79 Lord Neuberger’s reasons were reasons 
for disobeying s.53, with no compelling reason for why this was the 
best meaning to be ascribed to the statute. But maybe he was right to 
disobey the statute. An interpretation of a statute answers the 
question: what does the statute mean in this case? There is always a 
further question: should we apply or depart from the statute in this 
case? 
 
THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF DISOBEDIENT ‘INTERPRETATIONS’ 
 
The third and final challenge that I want to consider is the argument 
that disobedience to statutes, under the guise of interpretation, can be 
constitutional in the sense of consistent with fundamental rules such 
as the rule of recognition. If the rule of recognition is, to put it 
crudely, determined by whatever judges generally do in identifying 
the law, perhaps the fact that judges identify the law using 
disobedient “interpretations” of statutes—that is, amending statutes 
while purporting to interpret them—is evidence of a rule of 
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78 Cf. Allan, “Law, Democracy, and Constitutionalism” [2016] C.L.J. 38 at 55–58; 
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recognition that treats the meaning of the statute as inconclusive in 
determining the content of law. 
First, is it possible for a legal system to have a rule of 
recognition along these lines? If you accept Raz’s sources thesis—a 
central tenet of exclusive, or hard, legal positivism—you may be 
unconvinced that this is possible. One consequence of the sources 
thesis is that legal interpretation is not interpretation of the law, but 
of its sources.80 Indeed, it may be said with considerable force that 
the reason why interpretation is central to legal reasoning, whereas it 
is not central to moral reasoning, is that law has sources, whereas 
morality does not. This is not the place to assess the merits of the 
sources thesis. Instead, I will assume the correctness of Hart’s 
thesis—sometimes described as inclusive, or soft, legal positivism—
that it is possible for the law to include non-source-based criteria of 
legal validity. Put differently, I will assume that it can be 
contingently true that the meaning of a statute does not determine the 
content of the law.81 
With this assumption, let’s consider the question whether 
instances of disobedience to statute, such as the one in Evans, are 
evidence of this kind of rule of recognition. My main response to the 
third challenge is this: the fact that judges have a practice of saying 
that they are interpreting and applying the statute to identify the law, 
even when they are effectively disobeying or amending the statute, is 
itself evidence of a normative attitude—a tacit presupposition among 
judges—that there is a rule of recognition that requires valid law to 
be identified with the meaning of a statute. As Jeffrey Goldsworthy 
puts it, if judges lie and conceal their disobedience of a statute under 
the guise of an interpretation of it, “the fact that they felt it necessary 
to do so—rather than to boldly claim authority to rewrite statutes—
indicates that they themselves realised that their disobedience was, 
legally speaking, illicit.”82 We do not need to suspect bad faith to 
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Press, 2011), at p.224, arguing that this is necessarily, and not merely contingently, 
true. 
82 J. Goldsworthy, “Unwritten Constitutional Principles” in G. Huscroft (ed.), 
Expounding the Constitution: Essays in Constitutional Theory (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008), at p.303; see also J. Goldsworthy, The 
reach this conclusion. Interpreters who are mistaken, whether in 
good or bad faith, would presumably cease to defend their 
interpretations, and would accept criticism, if they were shown to be 
mistaken. 
This response to the third challenge faces two further 
objections. First, you may say, it ignores the fact that judges do 
sometimes claim the constitutional authority to depart from an 
ultimate source of law. Judges at the highest level in the United 
Kingdom have suggested, albeit always in obiter dicta, that there 
may be circumstances in which they would be constitutionally 
required to refuse to recognise a statute as valid law.83 Lord Hope, 
for example, said that, if legislation seeks to “diminish the role of the 
courts in protecting the interests of the individual”, the ideal of the 
rule of law “requires that judges must retain the power to insist that 
legislation of that extreme kind is not law which the courts will 
recognise.”84 The rule of recognition, however, is not determined by 
what judges say about the rule of recognition, but by the fact that 
they use it (and in doing so tacitly presuppose it without stating it) in 
the process of identifying the law. Claims such as Lord Hope’s, and 
some like-minded judicial colleagues, do not change the rule of 
recognition. Unless there is an established customary practice to 
support such claims, the best that can be said about them is that they 
highlight indeterminacy in the rule of recognition on this point. Or 
they are simply mistaken. In any case, the question addressed in this 
article is not concerned with the refusal to recognise a statute as valid 
law, but the consequences of judges acting inconsistently with a 
statute when they say they are interpreting it. 
The Human Rights Act 1998 may be thought to provide 
clearer evidence that it can be constitutional for UK courts to depart 
from the meaning of the statute. Section 3 of that Act states: “So far 
as it is possible to do so, primary legislation and subordinate 
legislation must be read and given effect in a way which is 
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compatible with the Convention rights.” This provision has been 
interpreted as requiring the courts, in some cases, to depart from 
parliamentary intent and amend the statute.85 That is, s.3 is alleged to 
extend the ordinary range of eligible interpretations open to the 
court. But whether that is really what this provision does is 
controversial, and space precludes consideration of this issue in this 
article. Suffice it to say that, even if the Human Rights Act does 
render judicial disobedience to statutes, under the guise of 
interpretation, constitutional—and I do not think it does—the judicial 
power to adjudicate in this way, like the judicial power to review the 
validity of legislation in jurisdictions with an entrenched 
constitution, does not prevent the possibility of unconstitutional 
interpretation in other contexts, where the s.3 power is not 
applicable. 
A second potential objection to my response to the third 
challenge is that it is inconsistent with an aspect of customary rules 
of recognition that I have just described. The rule of recognition, I 
said, is not what judges say it is, but what they do in using it. But I 
also said that the fact that judges say they are interpreting the statute 
to identify the law is evidence of a rule of recognition requiring the 
law to be identified in that way. It might be objected that these two 
statements are contradictory. But that objection is based on a 
misunderstanding. The statements are not contradictory, because 
when judges say they are interpreting a statute to identify the law—
just as when they say “It is the law that…”—they do not state the 
rule of recognition; rather, they use (and thereby manifest their 
acceptance of) an unstated rule of recognition requiring the law to be 
identified with the meaning of a statute.86 
Thus far, we have been concerned with the interpretation of 
ordinary legislation. But it is sometimes claimed that more creative 
interpretation, departing from the clear meaning of the text, can be 
constitutionally appropriate when the text being interpreted itself has 
a constitutional function. In the United Kingdom, one striking 
instance of this kind of creative interpretation, justified on the basis 
of the statute’s constitutional status, is Robinson v Secretary of State 
for Northern Ireland, in which the House of Lords, by a three-to-two 
majority, arguably departed from the clear wording of the Northern 
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Ireland Act 1998.87 Section 16(1) of that Act provided that the 
Northern Ireland Assembly “shall, within a period of six weeks 
beginning with its first meeting, elect from its members the First 
Minister and the Deputy First Minister”. If that period expired 
without any members being elected to those offices, then, as required 
by s.32(3), “the Secretary of State shall propose a date for the poll 
for the election of the next Assembly.” Notwithstanding these 
provisions, the majority in Robinson held that an election to fill the 
offices after the expiry of the six-week period, without a fresh 
election of the Assembly, was valid. 
In reaching that conclusion, Lord Bingham claimed that the 
Northern Ireland Act is “in effect a constitution” and so “should, 
consistently with the language used, be interpreted generously and 
purposively, bearing in mind the values which the constitutional 
provisions are intended to embody.”88 This statement is ambiguous. 
On the one hand, it does not appear to suggest anything unusual: it 
acknowledges the limits to interpretative creativity (“consistently 
with the language used”); and the idea that the provisions should be 
interpreted “purposively”, in the context of the statute as a whole, is 
merely part of the ordinary approach to statutory interpretation.89 On 
the other hand, the majority’s interpretation is inconsistent with the 
text of the 1998 Act (as the dissentients to my mind persuasively 
argued),90 and the fact that Lord Bingham justified this interpretation 
by highlighting the statute’s constitutional status, to be interpreted in 
a special way (“generously”), suggests an acknowledgment that the 
interpretation went beyond the ordinary limits of statutory 
interpretation. The argument that constitutional texts ought to be 
interpreted in a special way, which is more innovative than would 
otherwise be appropriate, is a familiar one and may even be 
persuasive in some contexts.91 But the fact that Lord Bingham 
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89 See e.g., R. (Quintaville) v Secretary of State for Health [2003] UKHL 13; 
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90 See Robinson [2002] UKHL 32 at [59]–[61] (Lord Hutton). 
91 For a classic statement of this approach to constitutional interpretation, see A. 
Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics, 
2nd edn (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986). See also J. Raz, “On the 
Authority and Interpretation of Constitutions: Some Preliminaries” in L. Alexander 
acknowledged the ordinary limits on interpretative creativity, 
combined with the fact that a special approach to the interpretation of 
constitutional texts has been rejected in subsequent cases,92 
undermines any argument that the rule of recognition has come to 
embrace departures from the meaning of the statute in cases of 
constitutional significance. 
Yet even if disobedient interpretations are incompatible with 
a legal system’s rule of recognition, it might be thought that they can 
nonetheless be constitutional. For rules of recognition are not the 
only secondary rules that form the constitutional foundations of a 
legal system. As Hart explained, there are also rules of change and 
rules of adjudication. Perhaps there is a rule of change that confers 
the power on the judiciary to change the law, including the law that 
has its source in statute. On the other hand, it may seem that a legal 
system’s rule of change cannot conflict with its rule of recognition. 
Whether we say that the rule of recognition is indistinct from the rule 
of change,93 or, alternatively, that the two rules are distinct but 
“presuppose each other’s existence”,94 it may seem that a rule of 
recognition will necessarily track a rule of change and vice versa.  
Yet there are reasons for thinking that the judiciary may have 
the power to change the law in the face of a conflicting rule of 
recognition. Contrary to what Hart appears to have thought, a legal 
system may contain several rules of recognition, which may conflict, 
and there may be no ranking among them.95 If so, it is possible that a 
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92 See e.g., Imperial Tobacco Ltd v Lord Advocate [2012] UKSC 61; [2013] S.C. 
153 at [15] (Lord Hope of Craighead): “the description of the Act as a 
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93 J. Waldron, “Who Needs Rules of Recognition?” in M. Adler and K.E. Himma 
(eds), The Rule of Recognition and the US Constitution (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009). 
94 J. Gardner, “Can There Be a Written Constitution?” in his Law as a Leap of 
Faith: Essays on Law in General (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), at 
p.105. Cf. Hart, The Concept of Law (2012), at p.96. 
95 J. Raz, Practical Reason and Norms, new edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1999), at p.147; Raz, The Authority of Law (1979), at pp.95–96. For Hart’s 
suggestion that a legal system has just one rule of recognition, see Hart, The 
Concept of Law (2012), at p.95 and p.105. See also H.L.A. Hart, “Lon Fuller: The 
legal system may contain both a rule of recognition requiring the 
court to identify the law with the meaning of a statute (with a 
corresponding rule of change empowering the legislature to change 
the law), and a rule of change empowering the court to change the 
law in a way that is inconsistent with a statute (with a corresponding 
rule of recognition requiring later courts to identify its 
misinterpretation as law). 
That sort of conflict among constitutional rules is possible, 
but it might be objected that the criteria of legal validity are ranked 
in a hierarchical relationship: aside from occasional obiter dicta and 
extra-judicial writings, it is generally accepted that the common law 
is subordinate to statute law. Yet it may be more nuanced than this 
simple picture allows. It could be argued that, when a court acts 
inconsistently with a statute while purporting to interpret the statute, 
the resulting misinterpretation changes the law, unless and until it is 
subsequently overruled by a court of concurrent or higher 
jurisdiction. If courts have the constitutional authority to make 
mistakes in this way, it seems plausible that a rule of recognition 
identifying the law with the meaning of a statute may conflict with a 
rule of recognition identifying the law with whatever the court deems 
the law to be, even if this is a departure from the meaning of the 
statute. 
This way of thinking about rules of recognition and change is 
more at home in the context of the common law than statute law. The 
difference is instructive.96 We can think of the common law as 
founded on two different rules of recognition. Others have spoken of 
law having a “double life”,97 or of there being “two conceptions of 
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96 Cf. Allan, The Sovereignty of Law (2013), at p.84: “There are no helpful 
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97 J. Finnis, “The Fairy Tale’s Moral” (1999) 115 L.Q.R. 170 at 170, arguing that, 
on the one hand, we can say (descriptively) that a supposed rule of common law 
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law”.98 But describing the common law as founded on two rules of 
recognition is a better understanding of the practice of the courts. As 
we shall see, when judges, at least in higher courts, depart from 
existing precedent and are said to have changed the law, sometimes 
they say that they are declaring what the law is and has always been, 
identifying the law by principled reasoning that views the precedent 
as mistaken about the law. This is the declaratory theory of law, 
which has been much criticised, but which should not be lightly 
dismissed.99 We all know that the common law is made and changed 
by judicial decisions, and this feature may seem fatal to the 
declaratory theory. But we can rescue the declaratory theory by 
explaining the common law as containing two rules of recognition: 
one identifying the law with the source of precedent, changing as a 
result of judicial decisions, including judicial mistakes about what 
the law was; the other identifying the law with objective standards 
that remain unchanged despite judicial decisions to the contrary. Let 
us consider this feature of the common law more closely, and then 
contrast it with statute law. 
The courts’ constitutional authority to change the common 
law, even by misinterpreting the precedents, is generally 
acknowledged. A good example is the recent case of R. v Jogee,100 in 
which the UK Supreme Court unanimously held that, for over thirty 
years, courts had been misinterpreting the common-law doctrine of 
secondary liability relating to so-called joint enterprises. The 
common law had taken what the Supreme Court described as a 
“wrong turn” in 1984,101 when in the case of Chan Wing-Siu the 
Privy Council held that, if accomplices venturing out with the shared 
purpose to commit a criminal offence could foresee that one of them 
might commit a second, different offence, then, in the event that one 
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accomplice commits the second offence, all other accomplices could 
also be guilty of that offence.102 In Jogee, the Supreme Court 
concluded that, on a correct interpretation of the doctrine established 
by decisions before 1984, the other parties would only be criminally 
liable for the second offence if they intended to encourage or assist 
the principal to commit it; foresight was not sufficient. In 1984, the 
Privy Council, due to “an incomplete, and in some respects 
erroneous, reading of the previous case law, coupled with 
generalised and questionable policy arguments”,103 had wrongly 
substituted foreseeability for intention, resulting in “the striking 
anomaly of requiring a lower mental threshold for guilt in the case of 
the accessory than in the case of the principal.”104 The Supreme 
Court in 2016 corrected that mistake.105 
When the common law develops in this way, there are two 
ways of explaining what happens, corresponding, in my view, to two 
rules of recognition. One explanation is that the Supreme Court in 
Jogee declared what the law had been all along, despite the mistake 
in the earlier case. It might be thought that convictions based on a 
precedent, faithfully applied at the time of conviction, should not 
become unsafe when the precedent is overturned, just as they do not 
become unsafe when the legislature changes the law by enacting a 
statute without retrospective effect. But the English courts, in 
determining the applicable law in appeals against convictions, have 
decided to act as if the common law were the same all along, just as 
it is when a court corrects a previous judicial misinterpretation of a 
statute.106 The approach highlights the continuing relevance of the 
declaratory theory. 
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is disagreement about this account. Cf. F. Stark, “The Demise of ‘Parasitic 
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106 See R. v Bentley (Deceased) [2001] 1 Cr. App. R. 21 at [5] (Lord Bingham 
C.J.): “Where, between conviction and appeal, there have been significant changes 
in the common law (as opposed to changes effected by statute) or in standards of 
Another explanation is that the Supreme Court in Jogee in 
2016 changed the law, just as Chan Wing-Siu was said to have 
changed the law in 1984. Both changes were constitutional, which is 
to say, in accordance with a rule of change (and a corresponding rule 
of recognition) in that legal system—even though, in the earlier case, 
the change was unintended, a consequence of the court’s 
misinterpretation of previous decisions. As the Supreme Court 
acknowledged in Jogee, “[i]t was, of course, within the jurisdiction 
of the courts in Chan Wing-Siu and Powell and English to change the 
common law in a way which made it more severe”.107 Since the 
common-law doctrine of secondary liability had been “unduly 
widened by the courts, it is proper for the courts to correct the 
error.”108 This phenomenon of higher courts misinterpreting and 
reinterpreting the common law, and changing it in the process, is not 
uncommon.109 
But this phenomenon is very different from what happens 
when a court misinterprets a statute. In another criminal law case, R. 
v Mitchell, concerning the effect of correcting previous judicial 
misinterpretations of a statute, Geoffrey Lane L.J. said: 
 
the fact that there has been an apparent change in the 
law or, to put it more precisely, that previous 
misconceptions about the meaning of a statute have 
been put right, does not afford a proper ground for 
allowing an extension of time in which to appeal 
against conviction.110 
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Unless there is a constitutional rule of change that confers power on 
the courts to change statute law, the law does not change (it only 
seems to change) when courts misinterpret statutes or correct 
misinterpretations of statutes.111 If a legislature exercises its 
constitutional power to change the law without retrospective effect, 
this constitutionally recognised change in the law would be irrelevant 
to an appeal against a conviction, because the old law, valid at the 
time of conviction, would remain the applicable law. However, a 
judicial misinterpretation of a statute does not change the law, rather 
it is a mistake of law. The mistake provides a good ground for an 
appeal against a conviction, not relevantly different from an appeal 
on the ground that new evidence has been found. 
We can draw a rough analogy between the effect of judges 
misinterpreting a statute and the effect that an unconstitutional 
statute has on the law, in legal systems in which statutes can be 
invalid.112 An unconstitutional statute is invalid and does not change 
the law.113 To some extent, the same is true of a judicial 
misinterpretation of a statute. The analogy is not exact, because 
lower courts may be bound by a rule of adjudication to follow the 
decisions of higher courts even if they are mistaken, with a 
corresponding rule of recognition identifying those decisions as valid 
law. In this way, judicial misinterpretations of statutes can create 
valid law, authoritatively binding on lower courts. But once the 
mistake is corrected by the higher court, the overturned judicial 
decision ought to be recognised as having been invalid all along. A 
statute cannot have contradictory meanings at different times, and, 
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after the correction, the earlier judicial misinterpretation cannot 
henceforth be recognised as having created valid law, because that 
would entail that the common law is superior to statute law. In 
contrast, due to the common law’s source in judicial precedent, a 
misinterpretation of the common law does change the law (under one 
rule of recognition), even though judges sometimes act as if the law 
does not change as a result of their decisions (under another rule of 
recognition). 
The failure to understand the difference between common 
law and statute law can be seen in the minority’s, and arguably also 
the majority’s, speeches in Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Lincoln City 
Council, a case which contains an interesting discussion of the 
declaratory theory and the question of what counts as a mistake of 
law.114 The parties in that case had acted on a settled view of the law, 
which was corrected by the House of Lords in Hazell v 
Hammersmith and Fulham LBC interpreting a statutory provision.115 
Assuming that the court’s decision in Hazell ascribed the correct 
meaning to the statute, the majority in Kleinwort Benson reached the 
right conclusion: prior to the Hazell decision, the parties had been 
acting under a mistake of law, because the meaning that the court 
correctly ascribed to the statutory provision in Hazell was the 
meaning it had always had. 
But Lord Browne-Wilkinson and Lord Lloyd, dissenting in 
Kleinwort Benson, argued that the court’s interpretation in Hazell 
had changed the law, and so the parties had made no mistake of 
law.116 They reached this conclusion by drawing an analogy with the 
development of the common law, where a judicial decision overrules 
an earlier judicial decision. They rejected the declaratory theory of 
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the common law, which the majority had defended.117 But in doing 
so they failed to recognise the difference between the development of 
the common law and statutory interpretation. The former is 
determined by judicial decisions; the latter is determined by the 
meaning of a statute. Only if a statute is indeterminate can a judicial 
interpretation of a statute be said to change the law.118 
The point is also well illustrated by the Brockhill Prison case, 
in which a prisoner applied for a writ of habeas corpus and sought 
damages in the tort of false imprisonment, because the prison 
governor had calculated her release date according to an 
interpretation of s.67(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1967 that at the 
time was supported by decisions of the Divisional Court, but that the 
Divisional Court later held had been mistaken. Counsel for the prison 
governor argued that he had a defence to an action for damages 
because the detention was “lawful at the time”, according to the 
Divisional Court’s earlier interpretation of the statute, and the 
Court’s decision to overrule its earlier interpretation should not have 
retrospective effect. If it had been successful, that argument—that the 
law changed—would have entailed that the content of the law is not 
determined by the meaning of the statute, for, as Lord Hope noted, it 
cannot sensibly be argued that s.67(1) meant different things at 
different times.119  
Unless the statute’s meaning is indeterminate, statutory 
interpretation involves ascribing to a statute a meaning that it has 
always had, and so declares what the law has always been since the 
statute came into force. One consequence is that, for subjects trying 
to work out the meaning of a statute, “any legal decision is no more 
than evidence of the law”.120 Oddly, the judges in Brockhill Prison 
discussed the idea of prospective overruling without any 
consideration of the fact that it was an interpretation of a statute, 
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rather than the common law, that had been overruled. Lord Slynn 
thought that prospective overruling in some cases may be “desirable, 
and in no way unjust”,121 whereas Lord Hobhouse described 
prospective overruling as “a denial of the constitutional role of the 
courts”.122 But prospective overruling is problematic in the context of 
statutory interpretation, not (or perhaps not only) because, as Lord 
Hobhouse believed, judges should not adopt this legislative role, but 
because judges have no power to change statute law, or to put it 
another way, because the rule of recognition identifies the law with 
the meaning that the statute actually has, as distinct from the 
meaning that a court erroneously ascribes to it. 
It might be objected that, although inconsistent with the rules 
of recognition and change, judicial disobedience to statute, under the 
guise of interpretation, can be rendered constitutional by the legal 
system’s rules of adjudication. While it may be impermissible for 
judges to change statute law, a rule of adjudication confers on them 
the constitutional authority “to make authoritative determinations of 
the questions whether, on a particular occasion, a primary rule has 
been broken.”123 That authority must entail the right to make 
mistakes, and the judicial determination, even if mistaken, is binding 
on the parties and on lower courts. Moreover, Hart wrote that this 
rule of adjudication will entail a certain kind of rule of recognition, 
for the court’s decision “cannot avoid being taken as authoritative 
determinations of what the rules are.”124 But a rule of adjudication 
and recognition that makes judicial decisions a source of law cannot 
be viewed in isolation from other ultimate criteria of legal validity in 
the legal system.125 Although it is primarily judicial practice that 
determines the content of the rule of recognition, judges are under a 
duty to act consistently with the rule of recognition. A court breaches 
that duty, and so acts unconstitutionally, if the rule of recognition 
                                                     
121 Brockhill Prison [2001] 2 A.C. 19 at 26 (Lord Slynn). On prospective 
overruling, see e.g., M. Arden, “Prospective Overruling” (2004) 120 L.Q.R. 7. 
122 Brockhill Prison [2001] 2 A.C. 19 at 48 (Lord Hobhouse of Woodborough). 
123 Hart, The Concept of Law (2012), at p.96. 
124 Hart, The Concept of Law (2012), at p.97. 
125 N. MacCormick, H.L.A. Hart (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1981), at 
p.119: “the rules of recognition, changes and adjudication are indeed necessarily 
interlocking and interacting, so that change in or redefinition of one must be 
mirrored by change in or redefinition of another.” 
gives legal supremacy to statute and the court acts inconsistently 
with the meaning of a statute. 
 
CAN UNCONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION BE LEGITIMATE? 
 
One final question arises, which can only be raised briefly here by 
way of conclusion. It concerns the relationship between 
constitutionality and moral legitimacy. The description of judicial 
disobedience to statute as unconstitutional has the sound of moral 
disapproval. But since the rule of recognition is a matter of what 
actually happens, it cannot answer the moral question of what judges 
should do. Thus, unconstitutional interpretation may be morally 
legitimate. As Raz acknowledges, judges who follow his views on 
interpretation “may find themselves morally obliged to disobey the 
law of their country.”126 The question of what judges should do is a 
moral question that ultimately depends on the legitimate authority of 
the institutions concerned, namely the court and the legislature.  
Often, the scope of the legislature’s legitimate authority can 
help to determine the meaning of an unspecific statutory provision. 
But when the statute cannot be given an interpretation that would be 
within the legislature’s legitimate authority, the court may be morally 
justified in acting unconstitutionally and departing from the statute. 
We can disagree about the extent to which judges are morally 
justified in doing so.127 But if the argument in this article is sound, it 
is unlikely that disobedience would never be justified. 
If judges cease to disguise their disobedience as an 
interpretation of the statute, that change in judicial practice may, over 
time, bring about a change in the rule of recognition, and hence make 
the disobedience constitutional. That possibility serves to highlight 
that the important question is the moral one, not the constitutional 
one. But clarifying what counts as disobedience and what counts as 
unconstitutional helps to clarify the moral question. 
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